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ABSTRACT 
The Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement of 1956 is commonly seen 
as marking a shift in policy and in political rhetoric, away from public 
housing provision towards private home-ownership. Before examining 
the evolution of this policy shift, this paper frames it within the context of 
the social history of the early 1950s, particularly the post-war affirmation 
of the independent family, with its commitments to domesticity as a basis 
of citizenship, but in a period when a severe housing shortage also 
signalled uncertainties about the reliability of the economic boon. The 
paper then examines in detail the evolution of the 1956 Agreement within 
the conservative parties, the Commonwealth bureaucracy and the Cabinet. 
It concludes that, even though home-ownership emerges from these 
debates as a central ideological priority for the Menzies government, 
Cabinet thwarted the attempt of Senator Spooner — as the responsible 
minister — to abolish the CSHA altogether. 
IV 
The Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement of 1^56 
and the Politics of Home Ownership in the Cold War 
John Murphy 
It is not difficult to establish the general significance of the re-negotiation of the 
Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement in 1956; the new agreement re¬ 
directed Commonwealth funds from public housing provision towards private 
home-ownership, diverting 20 to 30 per cent of the funds to building societies 
and lending institutions, and encouraging state housing authorities to sell public 
housing they built with the remaining funds. The 1956 CSHA has frequently 
been seen as a stimulus to the pervasive ideology of home-ownership which 
became so much a feature of post-war Australia, though there has been debate 
over the causal linkages between the agreement as policy, the actual pattern of 
increasing home-ownership and the widespread cultural and ideological 
endorsement of the aspiration to home-ownership.* 1 Much of the discussion of 
these themes has construed policies directed towards home-ownership as 
building a constituency for conservatism, based on the aspirations of ordinary 
people for a suburban place and domestic fulfilment — aspirations about which 
the left has generally been disapproving. This paper examines the political 
context of housing and the home in the 1950s, and then sketches the evolution 
of the re-negotiated CSHA within the Menzies Cabinet. 
Home-centred citizenship 
Judith Brett’s study of Menzies’ rhetoric suggests the ways that he appealed to 
citizens’ intimate experience in family life as the basis of their political 
identification; against the rationalisation and impersonalisation of mass society, 
Menzies appealed to the affective, face-to-face “life world” of family 
experience, asking people to see themselves not as members of classes, or as 
This paper was researched and written as a Visiting Research Fellow at the Australian 
Centre, University of Melbourne. 
1 See Jim Kemeny, “The Ideology of Home Ownership”, in J.B. McLoughlin and M. Huxley 
(eds), Urban Planning in Australia: Critical Readings, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1986, 
pp. 251-258; Mike Berry, ‘“To Buy or Rent?’; The Demise of a Dual Tenure Policy in 
Australia, 1945-60”, in R. Howe (ed), New Houses for Old: Fifty Years of Public Housing in (Victoria 1938-1988, Ministry of Housing and Construction, Melbourne, 1988; Robyn 
Hollander, “The Wage-earner’s Welfare State and Owner-occupation, 1900-1972”, Policy 
Organisation and Society, no. 6, Summer 1993, pp. 72-84; Carolyn Allport, “Castles of 
i Security; the New South Wales Housing Commission and Home Ownership, 1941-61, in M. 
jf Kelly (ed), Sydney: City of Suburbs, NSW University Press with Sydney History Group, 
I Sydney, 1987, pp. 95-124, and Alastair Greig, The Stuff Dreams Are Made Of: Housing 
Provision in Australia, 1945-1960, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1995. 
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participants in mass organisations, but as citizens constituted in the private 
sphere.2 This represents a politicisation of domesticity, in that it transfers into 
political rhetoric, the intimate values and experiences of the private sphere; in a 
sense, this made political virtues of what, since the end of the war, ordinary 
people had been doing, in the marked demographic shift towards lower marriage 
age, a higher marriage rate and the baby boom. And so, the conservatives 
presented the nuclear family ideal as the cornerstone of society, to be supported 
through child endowment and tax deductions — though the latter went 
particularly to Australian born middle class families.3 If there may be an echo 
of maternal citizenship” in the ways that conservatives represented the family 
and motherhood in the 1950s, it now has none of the potentially radical 
dimensions which “maternalism” sometimes had as a strategy by which 
women’s dependence on husbands might be replaced by an abstract relation 
with the state.4 
What to make of this rhetoric of the family, so pervasive and apparently 
endorsed in the 1950s? I want to suggest two arguments. The first is drawn 
from Elaine Tyler May’s book Homeward Bound: the American Family in the 
Cold War which connects fervent domesticity with the politics of the Cold 
War.5 She suggests that the dominant metaphor of the Cold War — 
containment — is equally relevant to familial experience; that domestic 
ideology acted as a buffer against all that was seen as threatening and disturbing 
in the Cold War period — anxieties about communist threats, about the shadow 
of the Bomb that hangs over the decade, about internal social subversion and 
about the worrying effects of post-war prosperity. Family affluence was to 
contain discontent, domesticity would stabilise an otherwise unstable society 
experiencing rapid transformation. Affirming family identity was a form of 
politics, which demonstrated loyalty rather than subversion, stability rather than 
precariousness. 
A second way to understand what the family and domesticity meant in 
this period is drawn from Nicholas Brown’s study of Australian conservative 
2 Judith Brett, Robert Menzies' Forgotten People, Pan Macmillan, Sydney, 1993. 
3 John Murphy, “Shaping the Cold War Family: Politics, Domesticity and Policy 
Interventions in the 1950s’’, Australian Historical Studies, vol. 26, no. 105, October 1995, pp. 
544-567. 
4 Marilyn Lake, “A Revolution in the Family: The Challenges and Contradictions of 
Maternal Citizenship in Australia”, in Seth Koven and Sonya Michel (eds). Mothers of a New 
World: Matemalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States, New York, 1993, pp. 378-395. 
5 Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era, Basic 
Books, [New York], 1988. 
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intellectuals. Menzies’ promotion of the “independent virtues’ of thrift, self¬ 
provision and independence from the state suggested a distinctive image of 
citizenship, which may have appealed precisely because these were seen as 
values that were vulnerable in the face of mass society. In social theoretical 
attempts to characterise identity and social change in the 1950s, conservative 
intellectuals took up David Riesman’s theme (in The Lonely Crowd) about the 
loss of individuality in mass society, with its implication that, in modern society, 
former categories of class and community identity were fragmenting, leaving 
only what Nicholas Brown calls “the amorphous individualised demands of 
prosperity”.6 
For the conservative intellectuals Brown studied — academics, marriage 
guidance counsellors, broadcasters — individuality and citizenship were seen as 
disturbingly “plastic” and contingent, and hence unstable, and their concern was 
with strategies for the “adjustment” of “personality” to social lunctions . 
Conservatives worried about the containment of the social forces unleashed by 
post-war prosperity and Cold War tension, and so emphasised the reconciliation 
of personality with social stability. Citizenship was, in effect, being a well- 
adjusted civic personality, attuned to social structures. The family was central 
to this process of reconciliation, because the family “was seen to provide an 
antidote to the mass society”, by playing a role in social stability, by 
regularising sexual relations and by socialising children. As Talcott Parsons put 
it: families were “factories which produce human personality”, a formulation 
strikingly like that of Corbusier, the classic modernist architect, that modern 
houses were “machines for living in”. 
During the 1950s, amongst conservative intellectuals, religious leaders 
and social commentators, there were some common anxieties about the 
maintenance of social stability amidst abundance and about the deterrence of 
internal subversion. Their images of society had in common an endorsement of 
familial stability as a means of shaping and containing civic identity. Ways of 
seeing the family were equally ways of seeing society and citizenship. If we 
say, then, that Menzies elaborated a public vision of citizens’ classless identity 
in the post-war years, it was one with intense emphasis on domesticity, as the 
locale of authentic non-rationalised values, and one which resonated with a 
wider intellectual disquiet about mass society. 
6 Nicholas Brown, ‘“Possess the Time’: The Formation and Character of Australian 
Intellectual Conservatism in the 1950s”, PhD, ANU, 1990, p. 2. 
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But given the swirl of anxieties and tensions within which these ideas of 
domesticity were being developed, the familial containment of the 1950s was 
not simply a retreat into private concerns. Menzies appealed to the family 
gathered around the radio to make domestic experiences the basis of political 
identity, but this was more than an endorsement of civic retreat and 
complacency in affluence. It was an appeal that touched on peoples’ experience 
of modernity and mass organisations, that saw citizenship as a personal 
affirmation, and that occurred within a context of Cold War strife. May 
suggests that the similar pattern in America was less a retreat from the public 
world, than “an expression of one’s citizenship. Postwar men and women were 
endorsing and affirming, through their families, the goals expressed by major 
political leaders and experts”, goals of family-centred security, of procreation as 
a national aim and of Cold War containment.7 It is a measure of the power of 
familial ideology during the Cold War, that civic virtue could now reside in 
enthusiastic domesticity. 
Within this political culture, home-ownership was clearly a widespread 
aspiration, as the tangible evidence of inclusion in the consumer boom, with the 
home as the “container” of civic virtues. Magazines such as Australia Today 
characterised the links between male citizenship, domesticity, home-ownership 
and prosperity in the following way: 
Today, the Australian is essentially and above all things a family man, 
whose home is his castle...the mature Australian man [is] a person who 
finds most of his satisfactions within the home circle. His great ambition 
typically to marry, to have a family, to purchase a house, to own a car and 
then to settle down to enjoy life...Above all things, the Australians are 
anchored to their own houses.8 
is 
The sentiment was widely noted, and widely endorsed, though with some 
qualms about the lack of interest in community organisations. 
After experiences of depression and war, Australians in the postwar years 
held genuine commitments to domesticity and the aspiration of home 
ownership.9 Writing in Australiati Mouse and Garden, one woman, Elizabeth 
Wells, provided a snapshot of these generational experiences: 
7 May, op cit., p. 160. 
8 Morven S. Brown, “Australians and their way of life”, Australia Today, October 20, 1956, 
!) See Carolyn Allport, “Women and Suburban Housing: Post-war Planning in Sydney, 1943- 
61”, in J.B. McLoughlin and M. Huxley, op cit., p. 237. 
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During the war years, while Andrew was overseas, I took a job and tried to 
save enough from my pay and the allotments Andrew sent me to buy a 
house. But when Andrew came back we spent more than half of our 
savings that first year while Andrew went back to school and I produced a 
son and heir. Now, my young man has had a cake with two candles, his 
father has had his first raise in his first post-war job, so I m ready to finish 
what 1 started in the way of a family. [But two will be enough] We still 
haven’t rebuilt our savings balance to buy that house and it s next on our 
agenda. 1° 
This was in 1950, and reflected people who knew the war as adults, other 
younger couples had, perhaps, less of this background ot built-up aspirations, 
but still endorsed the expectations of home-ownership. Writing in 1955, Bob 
and Zeita Esler, as a “young couple” who were owner-builders, put it like this: 
Because a home is the happiest place in the world, and the only perfect 
setting for family living, we decided that we’d do without anything to have 
a better-than-average house. [But] No young couple likes to borrow 
without careful consideration...Especially when repayment depends on the 
health and earning capacity of the breadwinner.* 11 
House and Garden was usually pitched at professional middle class 
couples with sunny dispositions, and the only cloud on their horizon was the 
housing shortage and the difficulties of housing finance for newlyweds. Man 
magazine, by contrast, often played to an underside of resentful misogyny and 
male discontents with suburban domesticity, representing marriage and 
mortgage as traps, and providing fantasies of escape to the South Pacific islands 
or into the arms of beautiful, but invariably dangerous, women. But it too, 
reflected the connections between employment (usually in white collar 
organisations) and domestic commitments. One of its short stories (they were 
frequently about breaking out of domesticity) has the husband exposed as an 
embezzler, trying to explain to his distraught wife: “1 did it, Jeanne. I wanted 
money, success, a home like this, prestige — 1 intended to replace the money.” 
With his wife unable to forgive him, he shoots himself. Domesticity and the 
home were here being destroyed by a desperate means to fulfilling these 
aspirations; the short story was significantly titled: “Death of an Idol”. 12 
Elizabeth Wells, “A Little Family Suits me”, Australian House and Garden, August 1950, 
p. 32. 
11 Bob and Zeita Esler, ‘‘We Borrowed to Build”, Australian House and Garden, November 
1955, p. 19. 
12 William D. Mills, ‘‘Death of an Idol”, Man, May 1950, p. 12. 
Although the aspirations of home and success were endorsed, the risk lay in too 
desperate a desire for them. 
The fluctuations of prosperity 
Throughout the 1950s, there was a persistent concern with the housing shortage, 
which was not only significant in itself, but disclosed a deeper anxiety about the 
reliability and the permanence of the economic boom. By comparison with our 
period, since the end of the long boom in the mid-1970s, the 1950s appear 
something of a golden age of full employment, rising real wages and increasing 
standards of living. Yet within the 1950s, there are sharp fluctuations in 
prosperity; in addition, much social commentary was unsure, and even sceptical, 
about whether economic prosperity could be maintained. There was no 
consciousness of being in the first years of the long post-war boom. In popular 
magazines and fiction, the shadow of the Depression hung over the decade. 
This sentiment ran as an undercurrent to the implicit promise of Fordist 
compromise in the post-war years — that mass production would provide full 
employment and make possible mass consumption, and that consumer goods 
would be the fruits of co-operation, as a new politics of inclusion. 
Yet by the middle of the decade, the suspicion that the boom could not 
last seemed confirmed by experience. There are in fact two booms in the 1950s, 
with a distinct slump in the middle of the decade from 1952 or 1953 until 1957 
or 1958, and during this slump ordinary peoples’ aspirations for security, home- 
ownership and a higher standard of living receded again from grasp. In the 
middle of the decade, the promise of Fordist modernisation — of a consumer 
boom as the tangible evidence of inclusion — must have seemed brittle. 
When people were asked in Gallup Polls whether they thought they were 
better off, large majorities consistently said they were either worse off, or about 
the same as twelve months previously. In 1951, 60 per cent considered they 
were worse off, compared with 48 per cent in 1952, and then up again to 53 per 
cent at the end of 1953. In 1954 and 1955, sentiment swung in the direction of 
optimism, with majorities (of 52 per cent and 64 per cent respectively) saying 
they were now better off, but their confidence receded again. It was not untd 
early 1958 that there was another substantial turn for the better, when only 22 
per cent thought they were worse off, and 30 per cent said their standard ot 
living had improved since a year before. Even within this improvement in 1958, 
unskilled workers and farm labourers still considered that they were going 
backwards, and it was the professional middle class which showed the greatest 
6 
improvement.13 So we should be wary of general statements about unbroken 
improvement and prosperity through the decade. 
These fluctuations are also reflected in the persistent refrain of the 
housing shortage, perhaps made more acute by the widespread endorsement of 
the aspiration for suburban home-ownership, which — having been offered as a 
universal hope — now receded from grasp. In the early 1950s, when people 
were asked what was the biggest problem facing the federal government, 
economic conditions and inflation rapidly replaced communism as the major 
issue — in mid-1950, at the height of Menzies’ attempts to ban the Communist 
party, 45 per cent identified communism as the “biggest problem”, followed by 
14 per cent housing and 10 per cent the cost of living; but a little over a year 
later, at the end of 1951, communism was seen as the major issue by a mere 5 
per cent, and housing itself by only 7 per cent, but 48 per cent nominated the 
cost of living — the high inflation of 1952 and 1952.14 Unfortunately, the 
question was not asked again during the decade, but given that high inflation 
was seen as contributing to high housing costs, inflation and the housing 
shortage were seen as connected. At the end of the decade, 60 per cent of the 
population still thought that “judging by what you see and hear”, the “housing 
shortage” was not ending, a view held by substantially more Labor than 
conservative voters.13 This may only be a measure of opinion, rather than 
experience, but suggests how pervasive had been the discourse about housing 
shortages through the decade. 
House and Garden wrote regularly, and without relief, about the 
alternatives facing young couples who wanted a home of their own; there were 
few places to rent and if available the rent would be too high16; living “cooped 
up in small homes with in-laws [had] reached appalling proportions”, and the 
choice seemed to between “home and no children, or children and no home”17; 
other articles recounted experiences of living in converted garages, or building 
temporary housing on a purchased block of land.18 Most of these accounts were 
cheerfully though pitifully disappointed, but a more grittily working class 
account such as Dorothy Hewett’s Bobbin Up (written in 1958), reveals housing 
13 Australian Gallup Polls, April 1951 to February 1958. 
Dec^U\95\-C]iin^\952)P°llSx n°' 691 (Published 3^ne-July 1950) and nos. 822-834 (published 
13 Australian Gallup Polls, no. 1495 (published Oct.-Dec. 1960) 
Australian House and Gardenx Oct 14, 1957 
Australian House and Gardenx May 1958, (letter). 
Australian House and Garden1 December 1951 and November 1952. 
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as a major problem amongst workers in Sydney’s inner suburbs, with slum 
landlords arguing that rent control had meant they could not afford to fix leaking 
roofs, and with aspirations to home-ownership terribly tenuous, if not futile. 
In 1958, House and Garden editorialised on the housing problem. The 
legacies of the war — rationing and black markets — were now long gone, and 
the stores were full of goods “that were hard to get a few years ago”: 
Yes, we have everything. Everything, that is, but the most important thing 
of all — housing. Housing is the only shortage still with us. It is the only 
shortcoming in the whole nation we haven’t solved. And whose fault is it? 
The cry is unanimous — the Government’s. Of course the Governments 
are to blame. They could be doing more. They have had 10 years to solve 
this problem and they haven’t done it yet. But what about some self-help? 
The article then went on to argue that the building industry and lending 
institutions could do more, the former by increasing efficiency and cutting costs, 
the latter by more active investment in housing. But the editor also turned a 
scolding eye upon ordinary citizens, who were not prepared to make enough 
sacrifices to save to buy a house, and who expected home-ownership as a right: 
“Can we be sympathetic towards these people? After all, nothing helps quite so 
much as helping yourself...A home may be every man’s heritage but this doesn’t 
mean that it must be presented to him on a plate.” 
But it was not clear what the conclusion from this train of thought should 
be; although the civic virtues well articulated by Menzies — of individual thrift 
and self-provision — were clearly being asserted, they were not necessarily 
presented as the solution, because “housing is a nation-wide asset — it is 
everyone’s responsibility, not just the Government’s or the financier s. This 
acceptance of the shortage has gone on too long.” 19 The magazine was 
passionate about home-ownership, as presumably were its 65,000 readers, but it 
seemed frustrated in the face of an intractable problem, rather than able to 
clearly diagnose its causes and propose policy solutions. If federal and state 
governments had tied their stars to home-ownership, they were getting little 
credit from House and Garden; if the Commonwealth’s CSHA changes of 1956 
were intended to signal a commitment to home-ownership, they were not 
mentioned in this analysis, and had certainly bought no political credit. But 
equally, the government was not being held clearly responsible for housing 
19 Editorial “The Housing Shortage - whose problem is it?”, Australian House and Gardenx 
April, 1958, pp. 70-73. 
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provision, seen as a problem of the nation, rather than of the government of the 
nation-state. 
Within the boom of the 1950s, then, aspirations for home-ownership as 
one of the major fruits of Fordist co-operation were far from satisfied, during 
the slump in confidence and, to some extent in living standards, from about 
1952 to 1957, home-ownership had slipped from the grasp of many, and was 
seen as a problem in public discourse. The same pattern can be seen in figures 
on new housing expenditure compared with GDP. In 1949-50 and 1950-51, the 
annual growth in housing expenditure far outstripped the growth in the economy 
in general, then began to slip in 1951-52, before slumping profoundly during the 
contraction of the economy in 1952-53; it was not until 1957-58 that growth in 
housing investment was again greater than the overall growth of the economy.20 
The intense periods of investment in private housing were at the beginning and 
the end of the decade. In between these peaks lay substantial doubt and anxiety, 
that home-ownership as the tangible evidence of prosperity might remain 
unattainable, and that the home was out of read' 
The Treasury, inflation and housing 
Within this context of high political and cultural values placed on home and 
property, the Federal Government was balancing a number of contradictions. Its 
own political mores were tied to home-ownership and what Judith Brett calls 
“home-centred independent individualism. . yet its commitment to national 
development and economic expansion threa ened to exacerbate the inflation and 
the shortages which could undermine that dream. In the first half-decade of the 
government, however, ministers such as Spender, Casey, Spooner and Fadden 
showed some talent for integrating analysis of different policy areas, in the 
attempt to balance these contradictions. 
National economic development, as a major priority in the first years of 
the decade, was seen as related to defence preparedness in the Cold War (in 
terms of self-reliant industrial capacity), and this was in turn connected with an 
ambitious immigration program (to expand the economy, increase the labour 
force and produce a more defensible population); rapid growth was increasingly 
seen as linked with inflation, as a major policy problem by 1951, and inflation, 
growth and immigration were all seen as intimately related to housing, though in 
contradictory ways. For example, housing hortages could threaten public 
20 Calculated from R.A. Foster and S.E. Stewart, Australian Economic Statistics: 1949-50 to 
1989-90, Occasional Paper no. 8, Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney, 1991, table 5.2b. 
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support for the immigration program, yet immigration required expansion of 
more housing; rapid growtli in the economy made it harder to divert capital, 
materials and skilled workers towards housing, yet housing was also seen as a 
key industry; inflation was pushing up the costs of housing, and further growth 
in the housing industry might only fuel more inflation. 
The inter-relation of these different aspects of policy is obviously 
complicated, and is scarcely sketched here, but a general point is that by 1951, 
rapid inflation as a consequence of the Korean war had severely alarmed the 
government, producing a tightening of policy that pushed aspirations such as 
home-ownership further out of reach. Well into 1953, the Treasurer held the 
line against Cabinet’s restiveness on housing, arguing that inflation was the 
major problem, that housing shortages were caused by shortages of materials 
and skilled labour, rather than shortages of finance, and that no special 
arrangements should be made for housing interest rates. 
In one sense, this was the Treasury line carried over from the Chifley 
government. As Treasurer and Prime Minister, Chifley was regularly requested 
to arrange lower housing interest rates for farmers, veterans and young marrieds. 
His consistent reply was that such arrangements for specific groups only 
represented a public subsidy to those groups, who were better served by the 
general government policy to keep interest rates as low as possible.21 As the 
new Treasurer, Fadden received the same entreaties, and dealt with them in the 
same way. For example, in July 1950, the Young Christian Workers’ 
Movement wrote to urge reduced interest rates for home loans, not least 
because: “All home-ownership schemes create a sense of dignity and 
independence which is the most effective answer we have to Communism.” 
The YCWM argued that subsidies to bring out migrants, while well spent, could 
equally be deployed as subsidies towards reduced interest rates for “married 
couples”, and “the resulting increase of Australian births would pay higher 
dividends in relation to population than the migration scheme”. This was a 
heady mix: with Communism, the birth rate and human dignity all resolved by a 
subsidy for home-ownership. But Fadden was unfazed, replying flatly that the 
Government’s policy was to keep interest rates as low as practicable, and the 
real problem with housing lay with the costs of building rather than the costs of 
finance.22 
21 See “Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement - Interest Rates”, Item 1948/1209, Part 1, 
A 571, Australian Archives (hereafter AA). 
22 F.W. Lombard to A.W. Fadden, 26 July 1950. in “Commonwealth-State Housing 
Agreement - Interest Rates”, Item 48/1209, A571, AA. 
10 
In March 1952, Fadden put a detailed submission to Cabinet on housing 
and the economy, arguing that housing supply had to be considered as part of 
general economic management. The building industry was a source of 
inflationary pressures, with “go-slow” patterns, over-time and black-marketing 
of materials. Costs had risen “inordinately”, and with the priority “given to 
housing for materials and equipment, other branches of industry and 
construction have gone short, causing pressures and cost increases there . 
Fadden then reviewed the provisions for housing finance through the trading 
banks, and argued: 
...in general, it cannot be said that the advance policy instructions (from the 
Commonwealth Bank] as they stand are either restrictive or illiberal. 
Whether the banks undertake this class of business is, of course, their own 
concern; the Commonwealth Bank could not direct them to do so even if it 
wished.23 
Treasury’s approach was rather phlegmatic, arguing that there was ample 
finance for housing, and that any more would be inflationary. This fitted with 
the extreme concern about inflation in 1951 and 1952, though it still left Cabinet 
with a problem in the area of housing. 
Again, in August, Fadden returned to the theme, with a draft submission 
allaying Cabinet anxieties about housing shortages and arguing that the line 
should be held against inflation. He noted a “sharp downturn” in housing 
construction, but the 
...root of the trouble lies in the level of building costs which rose so high as 
to deter many people from undertaking the building of homes, no matter 
how badly they needed them, simply because they could not face the price. 
...One vital point to make is that neither the Government nor the 
Commonwealth Bank could do more for housing at this stage without 
calling further upon central bank credit. 
Fadden would advise Cabinet to sit tight, because the essential solution “rests 
with the industry itself’, which should take its own measures to reduce the costs 
of building: 
23 Cabinet Submission no. 223, March 1952, in “Review of Housing and the Economy 
1952’’, Item C554, A4940/1, AA. 
unless and until the Government is assured that the industry lias reached 
and is likely to maintain a stable footing we would not, in my view, be 
justified in taking any further special measures to make additional finance 
available to it.Z4 
As the government rode out the high inflation of the early 1950s, and 
tightened policy to reduce growth. Treasury seemed to be returning to the 
austerity politics of the pre-war years, but this in turn pushed the promise of 
home-ownership beyond the reach of many. In the 1952-53 financial year, GDP 
contracted by 4.8 per cent, with new private housing investment contracting 
even further, by 6.8 per cent. The number of new houses completed dropped 
from some 78,000 in 1951-52, to 75,400 in 1953-54; as importantly, the 
proportion of these houses that were being constructed by “owner-builders” 
(either by their own labour, or dealing directly with sub-contractors such as 
bricklayers and plumbers) had risen from 33.3 per cent in 1951-52 to over 
39per cent two years later.25 As Carolyn Allport noted for NSW in this period, 
for low-income earners unable to buy or even to afford the terms offered by the 
Housing Commission: 
...the more feasible alternative...was to purchase land on the urban fringe 
and build their own houses. Many couples desirous of a home of their own 
used their wartime savings to make a deposit, or purchase such land. More 
often than not such “nest-eggs” were made available by the young wife or 
wife-to-be whose name usually did not appear on the title deeds, while 
others built on land subdivided and purchased by family members during 
the 1930s.26 
The same pattern was being noted in House and Garden, with its regular 
features and advice on how to convert a garage into a flat, the dis-economies of 
building temporary housing, and the processes and pitfalls of building your own 
house. And it was noted in bureaucratic discussions, for example within the . 
Immigration department, which took a keen interest in housing. In 1954, a 
senior research officer of the department described owner-building as “a 
remarkable development”, which was “the desperate homeseeker’s reply to 
building contractors’ prices which he cannot afford”. Owner building might be 
desperate, and might be inefficient, but “deserves encouragement”. “It is a sign 
of self help which it would be most unwise to restrain, especially in the case of 
24 “Housing Activity and Finance”, draft Cabinet submission of 18 August 1952, in 
“Housing Activity and Finance”, Item 1952/12/31, A6006, AA. 
25 Foster and Stewart, op cit., table 5.2b, and Australian Bureau of Statistics, Official 
Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, no. 43, pp. 638-639. 
26 Allport, “Castles of Security”, op cit., at p. 111. 
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migrants.”27 During the economic slump, then, as the gap between their 
aspiration for home-ownership and its allordability widened, ordinary citizens 
tried to bridge the gap with their own labour, a development which was seen 
both as a sign of desperation, but also as a welcome indicator of self-help. 
The Evolution of the CSHA 
Against this background, of home-centred citizenship and of housing 
aspirations, yet of the apparent fragility of the boom, Cabinet was held to the 
Treasury line until late 1953. In December, Cabinet appointed a Housing sub¬ 
committee consisting of William Spooner (as Minister for National 
Development), Treasurer Fadden, Senator John Spicer (Attorney-General), 
Wilfred Kent Hughes (Interior, Works and Housing), Athol Townley (Social 
Services) and William McMahon (Navy). This was to be the committee which 
developed the new Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement, with Spooner as 
its chairman and its driving force. The committee’s brief was to consider 
changes to the existing Agreement, including the sale of houses, and secondly, 
to consider “ways and means of stimulating home ownership”28 
It was not until early April of the following year that the Committee on 
Housing Policy met, to consider a detailed background paper from Spooner. 
This discussed four areas. First, it detailed the existing CSHA, and proposed 
solutions to various problems, including that there was no explicit limit on the 
Commonwealth’s liability, there were disputes over what constituted a “housing 
project” for the purposes of the agreement, and there were too many limits on 
the Commonwealth’s ability to specify standards and the location of houses 
built by the states. Second, Spooner discussed the desirability of selling off 
existing homes, since “the Governments are now landlords on a large and 
growing scale. This situation is fraught with potential political embarrassment; 
it also involves practical difficulties and increasing costs in maintaining the 
homes.” This potential embarrassment presumably referred to the consistent 
attacks Liberals made on Labor’s “socialist” planning, and certainly Spooner 
was strongly identified with the market liberalism of the NSW branch of the 
party. 
Sale of houses to their existing tenants would require that attractive terms 
be offered, but the irony was that the current terms of tenancy were themselves 
27 R. Kingston, “Notes on the Housing Position”, 16 February 1954, in “Housing Conditions 
and Statistics”, Item 202/3/6, A445/1, AA. 
28 “Decision no. 906”, 19 December 1953, in “Fifth Menzies Ministry - Minutes of Meetings 
- Decisions 856-1041”, Item Vol. 3, A4907/XMI, AA. 
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attractive, and too great an enticement to buy would raise “strong objections 
tiom traditional financing authorities”. Third, Spooner considered means of 
stimulating private investment in rental housing, but argued that, even without 
rent control, the rents that would have to be charged by private investors to 
yield an attractive return on current building costs would probably prove 
prohibitive to tne majority of prospective tenants”. Buildings costs were too 
high to make private investment profitable. 
Finally, Spooner turned to home-ownership, and did so with an acute eye 
to the politics involved. He argued that part of the problem was that War 
Service Homes offered “exceptionally favourable financial arrangements” (with 
low interest rates and long repayment terms), followed by building societies in 
NSW and Victoria — between them, these two avenues attracted the most 
demand for home finance, though they were unable to meet demand. The more 
traditional lending institutions required deposits beyond the reach of many, who 
were defeated by “the large gap that generally exists between building cost and 
the maximum advance obtainable...” Spooner saw political dangers and 
opportunities here. Unless a new housing policy could be developed, “the 
Commonwealth’s present difficulties, with their consequent political 
disadvantages may become worse”; but on the other hand, “there is an 
opportunity in the present situation for the Commonwealth to use the [housing] 
industry more directly as an instrument of economic policy, but also for the 
Government to gain greater public recognition of its part in stimulating home 
ownership”.29 In the subsequent developments, Spooner always had a keen eye 
for the political acclaim that could be gained from being seen to act on home- 
ownership, and frequently used this as one criterion for evaluating proposals. 
Spooner’s submission was considered by the Housing Policy Committee 
on 5th April, 1954, with Menzies and Josiah Francis (Minister for the Army) 
also present; unusually detailed minutes revealed a vigorous debate, with some 
sharp disagreements. There was disagreement on just how politically important 
housing was. Spooner and Kent Hughes argued housing was of paramount 
priority, and would be important in the forthcoming election; McMahon, Spicer 
and Townley all considered it as “moderately but not vitally important to the 
Government”. But Arthur Fadden was a good deal more truculent: “Housing is 
essentially a state matter. By virtue of the agreement the Commonwealth had 
assumed some responsibility but it should not seek to increase its responsibility 
29 “For Cabinet Committee: Housing Policy, GEN 26/1”, April 1954, in “Housing Policy 
1954”, Item C2554, A4940/1, A A. 
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in this field.” Although he did not consider housing an important policy area, he 
conceded it was an issue more pressing in metropolitan than country areas. 
There was support for a proposal, put by McMahon, that Commonwealth 
funds be diverted to building societies: “This would be a popular move and in 
keeping with the principle of encouraging private enterprise.” Spooner 
supported the idea, later to be the basic feature of the re-written CSHA, but “he 
felt that diversion of funds from the Housing Agreement was not the answer and 
certainly the State Governments would vigorously oppose the idea”. This 
caught the later developments in a nutshell. Menzies argued that the sale of 
public housing built under the existing CSHA should be encouraged, and 
reported that he had already floated the idea with the Premier ot NSW. Spooner 
put a proposal for tax incentives for home purchasers, on the model of the tax 
deductions which the government had introduced for dependent spouses and 
children and for premiums for health and life insurance. Fadden was adamantly 
opposed: it would reduce “the field of taxation” and make it more difficult to 
reduce tax rates, and “it would bring in its train all sorts of complications on tax 
concessions generally and could make more enemies than friends”. Although 
Menzies kept the proposal alive, saying that “it was worth further examination”, 
this was a battle Fadden was to win. Similarly, “the Treasurer was emphatic that 
he could give no support to any proposals for a ‘subsidised1 interest rate.”30 
Clearly Treasury was opposing any taxation or other subsidies to support home- 
ownership, effectively cutting down the range of options available to the 
committee as it sought “ways and means of stimulating home-ownership”. 
The Housing committee met a week later, on 14th April, and agreed to 
parts of a submission from Spooner. In particular, Spooner’s proposals for 
terms on which existing CSHA houses would be sold to their tenants were 
approved. He observed that over 60per cent of CSHA tenants were ex- 
servicemen and hence already entitled to purchase those houses under War 
Service Homes terms; they would be encouraged to do so. For the remaining 
CSHA tenants, Spooner proposed terms of a 10 per cent deposit (given that the 
size of deposit was seen as the major obstacle with conventional sources of 
housing finance) but an interest rate of 4.5per cent , which was the market rate. 
Spooner was acutely aware of not undermining the position of the banks and 
building societies, and proposed to “strengthen the competitive position of 
30 
“Cabinet Committee (Housing), Minutes of Meeting - 5th April, 1954” in ibid. 
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building societies”, effectively as compensation.31 These terms for the sale of 
existing CSHA houses were then approved by the full Cabinet some 5 days 
later.32 
At the Housing committee meeting, other parts of Spooner's submission 
were more contentious. Spooner tried again with proposals for tax incentives to 
encourage home-ownership, but now considered that a concession for home 
purchasers would be undesirable because, if “we give a tax incentive to people 
to purchase or own their own homes we may increase the demand for homes to 
be built with Government moneys”. What he seemed to mean was that the 
government should be taking less of a role in housing provision, “we want more 
private investment in the home building industry and less government moneys”, 
and a tax incentive would only encourage perceptions that the Commonwealth 
would provide. 
This was ironic however, given that Spooner was acutely aware of the 
political opportunities in being seen to have solved the housing shortage. 
Nevertheless, his overall perspective — as he put it “the pith of the problem” — 
was “to stimulate private investment and discourage the increasing demands 
upon Governments for funds for home building purposes.” Accordingly, 
Spooner argued, he was strongly in favour of tax incentives to mortgagees, to 
encourage private investment in housing, since “banks and other lending 
institutions would then have an inducement to lend to building societies. This 
would enable the building societies to provide more houses and as these houses 
were built the activities of the C.S.H.A. could be tapered off.” But, he noted 
with regret, “the proposal is not a practicable one at this juncture”, by which he 
presumably meant it was not politically practicable.33 
For some years, Fadden and the Treasury had been arguing that the 
housing shortage was not caused by a shortage of available capital, but Spooner 
continued to disagree. Within a clear political commitment to encouraging 
home-ownership, the Government was also committed to reducing its own role, 
and particularly to reducing cultural and political perceptions of its role. 
Spooner’s suggestions for housing themes in the policy speeches ot the 
approaching election illustrated this complex mix of intentions. He stated that 
31 “Submission GEN 26/1”, p. 4, [no date, but between 5 and 14 April, 1954] in “Housing 
Policy 1954”, Item C2554, A4940/1, AA. 
32 “Cabinet Decision no. 1005, 19-20 April, 1954, in “Fifth Menzies Ministry - Minutes of 
Meetings - Decisions 856-1041”, Item Vol. 3, A4907/XMI, AA. 
33 “Submission GEN 26/1”, op cit., p. 9. 
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“a housing policy should undoubtedly be designed to encourage people to own 
their own homes,” and went on to describe the government’s “proud record of 
progress” in providing finance through the CSHA and War Service Homes. 
Total Commonwealth finance, including the Commonwealth Bank, accounted 
for “40 per cent of the money spent in Australia in building new homes”. But if 
this suggested a record of activism in meeting the housing shortage, it was 
neither the policy direction nor the cultural expectation which Spooner wanted 
to encourage. 
The housing shortage is being progressively overcome. We are providing 
new homes for new families and tor New Australians. So that 
governments can concentrate more on slum clearance, we aim now to 
encourage private capital to provide an increasing share of the normal 
housing field.34 
One, more drastic, proposal which Spooner had briefly considered in his 
submission had come from John Cramer, who was a member of the 
Parliamentary Committee on Housing. This Parliamentary Committee of 
government backbenchers was militantly opposed to public housing, and 
regarded the CSHA as “the most powerful instrument to complete socialisation 
one could imagine”, which “creates a frustration to home ownership and 
encourages irresponsible citizenship”.35 Accordingly, Cramer had proposed 
that the CSHA be simply abolished, “and indeed all transactions with the State 
Governments”. In its place, a Housing Fund would be established in the 
Commonwealth Bank, which would lend to building societies: henceforth “the 
Commonwealth’s interest in housing would be to provide funds for the 
Commonwealth Bank”. Spooner saw problems with the idea, though he was 
prepared to suggest it to his committee, the reaction of which is not recorded. 
The main problem Spooner envisaged was that, because the CSHA was the only 
source of funds for building homes for rent, “there would be great objections to 
cancellation of C.S.H.A.”36 Nevertheless, by May of the following year, this 
had become the centre-piece of Spooner’s policy, but one on which he was to be 
defeated in Cabinet. 
Spooner’s position in mid-1954 was set out in a letter to Menzies. He 
wrote that he had finished the recent election campaign “quite concerned at our 
position in relation to housing”. Under the existing arrangements, the 
34 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
35 “National Housing”, Appendix C to ibid. 
36 Ibid., p. 7. 
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Commonwealth did not receive “recognition of the major role we have played”, 
yet housing was of crucial “electoral consequence”. If the Commonwealth was 
to continue its role in housing, “it should do so actively in order that the 
Commonwealth’s work in providing finance is better appreciated by the general 
public . The states tended to get the attention for housing provision, and the 
Commonwealth’s activity was not buying it sufficient political credit, at a time 
when housing was of such “electoral consequence”. Spooner’s point in what 
followed was how to re-design housing policy in such a way that the 
Commonwealth was publicly positioned to take the credit. 
Spooner then proposed to Menzies that payments under the CSHA be 
reduced to as low a figure as possible: 
...consistent with maintaining the provision of rental housing for those 
people who cannot be provided for by private enterprise. We should 
develop the means of getting finance into house building from a source 
which will be recognised as the outcome of Commonwealth policy. 
The means of doing this were either to establish a new department within 
the Commonwealth Bank, which would lend tor housing using the funds not 
allocated to the CSHA, or to use tax incentives to attract private funds to this 
new department or to building societies. 
In addition, Spooner identified problems in planning to overcome 
materials and skills shortages in the housing industry, and consequently 
insufficient planning to deal with the housing shortage (with his department 
estimating “at least 100,000 homes would be needed in Australia to meet the 
present shortages without touching the problem of sub-standard dwellings”). 
Finally, he proposed the establishment of housing as a separate portfolio “so that 
we have a proper perspective and a co-ordinated policy”. Spooner ended by 
claiming that he was not “seeking any new portfolio which may be created if 
you accept my views. Indeed unless you are prepared to provide finance for 
some new organisation I very much doubt the wisdom of creating a new 
portfolio.”37 The future of the CSHA was clearly now quite precarious, because 
it was not seen as an arrangement in which the Commonwealth received the 
political credit for financing housing, and nor did it satisfy Spooner’s 
ideological commitment to shifting the balance from what he had earlier called 
“government landlordism” to private investment in mortgages. 
37 W.H. Spooner to R.G. Menzies, 22 June 1954, in “[Menzies Papers] Correspondence with 
[mostly] W.H. Spooner’’, Item 4, M2576/1, AA. 
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Between mid-1954 and mid-1955, there appears to have been a lull in 
activity on housing policy; Spooner put his next substantial submission to 
Cabinet in May 1955, and its proposals to withdraw from the CSHA were 
defeated. Given the importance of the issue, it is worth briefly following the 
few threads available regarding the luture of the Agreement during this lull. In 
March 1955, officials of the Treasury and of the departments of National 
Development and Prime Minister wrote a paper on housing policy which 
canvassed various options. It the Commonwealth was to withdraw completely 
from the provision of rental house building under the CSHA, the officials 
argued, this would pave the way “lor a home ownership scheme , but it exposed 
the Commonwealth to some political dangers. The states would be able to argue 
that this withdrawal was “the prime cause of all future housing problems”, 
withdrawal of existing benefits such as rental rebates and subsidised rents in 
CSHA houses “could provoke public protest”, and finally, the Commonwealth 
would be relinquishing one means of macro economic policy control, losing the 
“ability to exert an influence upon the building industry for the purpose of 
achieving economic stability...” 
Other options which the officials considered included scaled-down 
versions of the CSHA, with a focus on building for “rental housing for families 
of limited means...”; the bureaucrats appeared to accept “the need for 
government participation in housing for less privileged groups”. Finally, they 
considered a “Commonwealth home ownership scheme...financing home 
builders”, reflecting Spooner's aim of stimulating home ownership in ways that 
rebounded to the credit of the Commonwealth.38 The Commonwealth Bank 
was seen as an appropriate vehicle for this, or a new authority could be created; 
interestingly, the idea of directing funds through the CSHA to building societies 
was not considered, and had not re-surfaced since McMahon had suggested it in 
April of the previous year. 
The character of potential political opposition to Spooner's as-yet vague 
plans can be seen in a letter from the South Australian Premier, Tom Playford, 
to Menzies. Playford defended the need for “a steady Bow of rental houses”, for 
those whose “financial circumstances or conditions of employment” meant that 
they could not contemplate home-ownership. Because building costs were so 
high, investors would not invest capital “in cottages to be let to the lower paid 
38 “Commonwealth Housing Policy”, 29th March 1955, in “Commonwealth Housing Policy 
1955”, Item C1323, A4940/1, AA. 
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workers”; consequently the states had to supply such housing. Playford went on 
to defend the efficiency of the South Australian Housing Trust and to insist that 
“the Housing Agreement should be kept in existence...” under the existing 
arrangements. In addition, Playlord did not object to proposals for the sale of 
Agreement houses, but was concerned that “in order to substitute private for 
State housing, the Commonwealth has had in mind the provision of funds to 
building societies.” Because South Australia had few building societies, a better 
solution would be to liberalise the conditions of advances from the 
Commonwealth Bank.39 
Playford gave no indication that he knew serious consideration was being 
given to the abandonment of the CSHA, yet this was the centre-piece of 
Spooner’s proposals to Cabinet, which were considered by Cabinet three days 
after Playford’s letter. Spooner’s document was forthright and radical, and 
represented his disenchantment with the CSHA and his commitment to private 
solutions to housing. He argued at one point in the submission that housing was 
“the activity in which the Commonwealth is at the greatest political 
disadvantage”, most probably a reference to the ways the states took the credit 
for housing policy. This sense of political frustration runs through the 
submission, animating his radicalism. Spooner proposed, first, that the 
Commonwealth not renew the CSHA in any form; second, that the government 
provide loan monies to the Commonwealth Bank for lending to building 
societies, and third, that a tax deduction be granted on interest earned from loans 
made to building societies. He justified the abandonment of the CSHA in 
political terms; the States 
...will want to offer — at the expense of the Commonwealth — the most 
advantageous terms that they can to both home builders and tenants. They 
will want to ensure that they receive the thanks for those terms and that 
they are able to continue the present position under which the minimum of 
credit comes to the Commonwealth. 
Accordingly, Spooner was now proposing a complete withdrawal from 
public housing; “building houses for rental should be left entirely to the States”, 
who could use their own revenue for the purpose, and the Commonwealth 
should withdrawal from rental subsidy schemes, other than those lo which it had 
a continuing commitment. He recognised unspecified objections and 
acknowledged that there were risks in the strategy, yet was presenting it in stark 
and unambiguous terms. 
39 T. Playford to R.G. Menzies, 27 May 1955, in ibid. 
Spooner was proposing the Commonwealth Bank scheme as an 
alternative to the CSHA; the Bank would be able to supplement from its own 
reserves the Loan Council funds the Commonwealth provided for building 
societies; there would be no change in the total amount allocated to housing, but 
it would be diverted from the CSHA to the central bank, to be clearly identified 
as a Commonwealth scheme, rebounding to the credit of the Commonwealth. 
His third proposal — of tax incentives to stimulate capital investment in 
building societies was justified in terms of “putting the [building] Societies in 
the most favourable position to raise as much finance as possible , for they 
represented “the best chance of breaking the vicious circle in which 
Governments have become involved in housing in Australia ’.^0 
This submission, then, contained the main themes Spooner had been 
working towards since early 1954: tax inducements to attract private capital 
into housing investment, a jaundiced and reluctant view of the Commonwealth’s 
involvement in housing, resentment that that involvement seemed to earn more 
criticism than credit, and commitment to using Commonwealth funds to 
stimulate private home-ownership rather than public housing. It was a mix of 
market liberalism and political calculation. Perhaps to fortify his position, 
Spooner despatched his paper to Menzies, to have it circulated under the Prime 
Minister’s name; though Menzies was hardly fulsome, noting simply on his 
covering note to Cabinet ministers that he had received it from Spooner and it 
“requires consideration before the forthcoming Premiers’ Conference’’.41 
In the Cabinet meeting that followed, Spooner was soundly defeated. 
Cabinet explicitly rejected each of his proposals, though it agreed “that the 
existing agreement needed substantial revision’’. In that revision, Cabinet 
wanted to ensure that the Commonwealth would control the amounts voted to 
housing, and that of this amount a specific proportion would be “allotted by the 
States through co-operative building societies for financing home ownership’’, 
with the remaining funds at the discretion of the states to use for rental or other 
housing.42 Here, then, were the outlines of the 1956 Agreement, imposed on 
Spooner by his Cabinet colleagues, who were not prepared to adopt his more 
radical proposals. But why was Spooner defeated? The Cabinet minutes are 
bare and cryptic, and reveal nothing of the discussion. Possibly, Cabinet 
40 
41 
42 
“Submission no. 374: Housing Policy”, 11 May 1955, in ibid. 
Covering note to Submission no. 374, R.G. Menzies, 30 May 1955, in ibid. 
“Cabinet Minute, Decision no. 474”, 16 June 1955, in ibid. 
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colleagues baulked at the strength of Spooner’s market liberalism in a period of 
Keynesianism; presumably, they were concerned at what the reaction of the 
Premiers would be to the termination of the Agreement and accepted the 
argument that termination would give the Premiers a pretext for blaming the 
Commonwealth for future housing problems, and perhaps they feared the 
electoral consequences of what Spooner himself had conceded was a hazardous 
strategy, which risked being seen to abandon all responsibility for public 
housing provision for low income earners. For whatever reasons, Spooner’s 
dramatic solution had been rejected by Cabinet, and he had been instructed to 
follow the path first sketched by McMahon over a year previously. 
At the end of July 1955, the Housing Committee of Cabinet decided that 
the new Agreement should specify 20 per cent as the proportion of funds to go 
to building societies under what was now called the Home Builders’ 
Programme.43 Spooner objected that this was too small a proportion, and his 
reasons were set out in a submission to Cabinet in August. Principally, he 
argued that the number of private houses that could be built with the 20 per cent 
appropriation “will not satisfy the demand” for home-ownership; his own 
proposal — that the Commonwealth increase the allocation to the Home 
Builders’ Programme — “offers the opportunity to [sic] the Commonwealth 
progressively to scale down the growth of State Housing Authorities. The 
decision of Cabinet [not to vary the 20 per cent] prevents this.” Spooner’s view 
rested on an antipathy to the growth of public housing authorities: “the problem 
is a real one and one concerning which our party members have strong 
views”.44 
Spooner had been prevented from abolishing the housing agreement, and 
from pulling the Commonwealth out of all provision of public housing; now, 
having been directed to use the CSHA as the vehicle for diverting 
Commonwealth housing funds into home-ownership, he was determined to 
divert as great a proportion as possible. His efforts were again rejected by the 
Housing Committee in September, when they decided not to vary their earlier 
decision, yet only two weeks later, Spooner was presenting to the press his 
43 “Cabinet Minute, Housing Committee, Decision no. 652 (HOC)”, 30 July 1955, in 
“Housing Agreement Bill 1956”, Item C1266, A4940/1, AA. 
44 “Submission No. 530: Housing - Proposals for New Agreement” and “Appendix II: Note 
on 20% Allocation for Home Builders’ Programme”, 26 August 1955, in ibid. 
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proposal that the proportion would be increased to 30 per cent after the first two 
years.45 
Spooner was up against some powerful opposition. The Premiers 
particularly Cahill in NSW and Playford in South Australia were still 
objecting to the diversion of any of their funds; in October 1955, all State 
Housing Ministers had met with Spooner to discuss the Commonwealth 
proposals and finished their first day “bitterly” attacking the Commonwealth on 
three particular points. They objected to the increase in the interest rate on 
housing loans from the commonwealth, which was to rise from 3 per cent to 
3.75 per cent 4^; they objected to a requirement that 10 per cent of homes built 
be allocated to armed services personnel, and finally, while they did not object 
to an allocation of funds to building societies, they insisted that “the money thus 
earmarked should be additional to the amount ordinarily available”. This, of 
course, was the antithesis of Spooner’s intention to cut funds from public 
housing and direct them towards home-ownership; his response to the Premiers 
was that they should take any request for additional funds to the Loans 
Council.47 But as Ronald Mendelsohn commented in a briefing paper to 
Menzies: “the States are not happy about losing 20 per cent from their rental 
housing moneys and at least would like that figure lessened, but they would not 
really knock back the remainder because it is only 80per cent.” They were less 
likely to be happy with an increase in the Home Builders’ Programme 
proportion to 30 per cent, and as Mendelsohn reminded Menzies, “you have 
recorded your disapproval of this”.4^ 
When all the States finally agreed to the new CSHA — the NSW Cabinet 
“reluctantly” accepted the Agreement less than two weeks before it came into 
effect on 1 July 1956 — Spooner had made concessions on the interest rate 
(which was still set at 0.75 per cent below the long term bond rate, but with 
provision for the discount to rise to 1 per cent if the bond rate went above 
4.5per cent — “an uncalled-for gift” to the States, in Mendelsohn’s view) and 
on defence force housing (where the Commonwealth would provide extra funds 
45 “Decision No. 628 (HOC)” Housing Committee of Cabinet, 5 September 1955, in ibid, 
and The Age, 22 September 1955. 
^ More precisely, the states were offered a discount of 0.75% below the long-term bond rate 
which the Commonwealth paid for the loan funds, which at the current rates would increase 
the interest rate by 0.75%. This represented a reduction in the subsidy which enabled the 
states to keep public housing rents low. 
47 The Age, 14 October 1955 [emphasis addeu]. 
^ R. Mendelsohn, Notes on Cabinet Submission No. 126: Housing — New Agreement 
between Commonwealth and States”, 4 May 1956, in “Housing Agreement Bill 1956”, op cit. 
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to pay for half of the 10 per cent of houses in question) and finally, the State 
Banks would not be excluded from use of the Home Builders’ Programme funds 
(one of the very few changes which Bolte had insisted upon)49 Spooner had 
allowed no concessions — against the opposition of the Premiers — on his 
proposal that the Home Builders’ Programme would increase to 30 per cent of 
total CSHA funds for the last three years of the Agreement. The effect was a 
diversion of 20 per cent from public housing funds, rising to 30 per cent after 
mid-1958, in addition to the removal of rent rebates and the reduction of interest 
rate subsidies. 
New South Wales was one of the strongest opponents of Spooner’s 
proposals, but he had some support from conservative forces in that state. In 
October 1955, the secretary of the Master Builders’ Association, W.D. Ford, 
said that the industry strongly favoured home-ownership. The Housing 
Commission had “done an excellent job”, but its role “should be limited to a 
necessary social service”, for those on low incomes. In addition, while public 
housing went primarily to families, Ford argued that the diversion of funds to 
building societies would benefit “young married couples with a capital of a few 
hundred pounds”.5° 
The Sydney Morning Herald itself supported Spooner in editorials, 
though with a curious ambivalence. It suggested that a nation of “worthy home 
owners” might be as “insufferable” as “too much State landlordism”, but 
because landlordism stifled “the spirit of enterprise”, the former was “better in 
principle”. The CSHA had played a useful role over the past ten years, but 
public housing should be confined to low-income families, retaining the 
“original ‘social service’ aspect of the scheme”. But the editorial then ended 
with a curious throw-away line: “the nation as a whole is still spending too 
much on ‘milk bar’ commodities to the neglect ot houses and other durable 
assets needed for development.”51 The “milk bar” economy was a common 
reference to the supposed preponderance of consumer spending over national 
development, but the editorial did not explain why private home-ownership was 
any more durable an asset than public housing. 
In mid-1956, when Cahill was still holding back from approving the new 
CSHA, the Executive Director of the Building Industries Congress, Stewart 
49 Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 1956. 
50 Sydney Morning Herald, October 11, 1955. 
51 Sydney Morning Herald, Editorial, 27 September 1955; another editorial supporting 
Spooner’s changes appealed on 29 May 1956. 
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Fraser, threw his weight behind Spooner’s proposals. The Premier was “playing 
politics”, but “it does not matter what instrumentality builds the homes as long 
as they are built...People who are waiting for loans from co-operative societies 
want a stake of their own in the country and don’t want the Government as a 
landlord.”52 But the discussion around the CSHA in the mid-1950s suggests 
rhetorical ways in which it did matter which instrumentality — the state or the 
market — built housing. For the Master Builders, public housing should be 
confined to low-income families; the Sydney Morning Herald agreed, and 
considered home-ownership to be a preferable condition to State landlordism. 
Stewart Fraser’s use of the common phrase which equated home-ownership with 
a stake in the country was redolent of the Cold War, and of the ways in which 
property was seen as an antidote to social dissent. 
Conclusion 
The expiry of the 1945 Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement was an 
obvious opportunity for re-consideration of the Commonwealth’s 
responsibilities for public housing in the middle of the uncertain boom of the 
1950s. What was done with the CSHA was, in a sense, an indication of the 
shifts in political rhetoric and sentiment during the decade: particularly, shifts in 
ideas of citizenship from public provision to private (though state subsidised) 
self-help, and from identity based on class and state entitlements to identity 
based in the family and domesticity. In this transition, the private home rather 
than public housing was seen both as the “container” of Fordist consumption, 
and the font of civic virtues. 
Perhaps Spooner had been attempting to push this transition even further, 
in his radical attempt to simply dismantle the CSHA, leaving only such public 
housing as the States were committed to, and a Commonwealth programme of 
lending for home-ownership. But his Cabinet colleagues were reluctant to go so 
far, retaining the institution of the Agreement, and using it as the vehicle for 
directing some funds to home-ownership. By comparison with what Spooner 
had attempted, his success was limited, but this suggests also some cultural and 
political attachment to the Agreement, perhaps with political overtones. Cabinet 
may have been reluctant to appear to have severed all ties with public housing, 
while Spooner, too, had a clear political intent, reflecting his frequently voiced 
resentment that Commonwealth funding of housing bought it too little political 
credit. 
52 Sydney Morning Herald, 19 June 1956. 
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Spooner published an article in October 1955 explaining “Why the 
Commonwealth Revised Its Housing Policy”, which touches some of these 
concerns. He recognised that the CSHA had done much to deal with the 
postwar backlog in housing, but the “emergency” was now over; wisely he 
refrained from revealing his own earlier intention to withdraw from public 
housing altogether, just as he did not reveal his frustrations with the states: 
If the Commonwealth is to continue to aid State housing (and we agree that 
it should) then we prefer that as much of that aid as possible should be used 
to assist people to build and own their own homes. We take the view that 
people who have worked and saved to get enough money to put a deposit 
on their own homes are at least as entitled to receive some aid from the 
community’s funds as is the person who seeks to solve his housing 
problem by going on a Housing Commission waiting list.53 
The moral terms were more subtle than his more forthright views in 
Cabinet, but they were easily recognisable in the 1950s. Spooner was 
appealing, as the Menzies government did in other areas of policy, to citizens 
who saw themselves as constituted by their independence from the state and by 
their aspirations in domestic commitment. 
It is this ideological shift in constituencies which is most emblematic in 
the new Agreement, seen not so much in class terms as in moral terms of self- 
help, independence and thrift. The Commonwealth government directed its 
attention not so much to the middle classes, as to those citizens who were 
marked out by particular attitudes and behaviours, and the aspiration for home- 
ownership was one distinctive marker of this idea of citizenship. They were the 
ordinary (usually middle-class) citizens who wrote in Australian House and 
Garden of their experiences of the depression and the war, their hopes of family 
stability in a world that was seen as uncertain, and of their conviction that 
“home is the happiest place in the world, and the only perfect setting for family 
living”. 
53 Sydney Morning Herald, 13 October, 1955. 
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